

**Cameroon Governance and Security Sector Reform: An Autopsy of State
Response to Emerging Security Problems in the Central Africa Sub
Region**

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Abstract

The problem in Africa South of the Sahara was not only that countries with a kind of thin or shoestring budget grappled to indebt themselves with loans to build, train and equip their security sector but also that security was wholly perceived to mean the protection of National Borders and its resources, signing of military accords and treaties thereby casting internal security away from crucial concerns. The problems and contradictions imposed by this conundrum of the parochial conception of Security architecture and operatives have combined with an array of poor governance to beg for reform wherein state governance and Human security must be seen as crucially interdependent. It is with this preoccupation that the UN, EU, and AU have undertaken lasting measures to reform the security sector placing human security and good governance at the centrality of its hub. If this has been urgent in other areas of the world, the need is crucially acute in the Central African Sub Region whose member states have been encompassed not only by issues of fragile states borne out of problematic governance as well as transnational crime, secessionists claim and arm uprising as well as a transnational crime. This is the Nexus underlying good governance and the Security Sector reform which is the Substance of this study. From a thorough review of primary and secondary sources, the study seeks to – provide the special context and circumstances underlying Good governance and its connection to Security Sector Reform in the Central African Sub Region- Bring out the cogent elements of good governance and connect how this is crucial in the Security Sector Reform – Cast a Scientific focus on Good governance within the Security Sector using key Central African Region states and showcasing how this is important in state and peacebuilding as offered by the UN and its corollaries.

Keywords: Security reform, good governance, autopsy, challenges

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Introduction

The roaring 90s imposed new realities that have been the subject of debates by multi-polar scholars. These new realities have imposed new demands on State governance and its security philosophy. Without any claim of being exhaustive, these debates have been animated by- the leftist against the rightists – the idealists versus the realists as well as those aligning behind the end of the History of Francis Fukuyama and the Clashes of civilization of Samuel Huntington. In spite of the witty submissions of the rightist, realists, and hard power proponents, all of them turn to agree in some measure of conclusive details that the digital age and globalization have breached old-established national boundaries and the notion of sovereignty necessitating a reshaping of governance and security. Good governance and security, therefore, form a currency of high premium in international Politics, especially in Africa, and a greater part of its territory fraud with the world's wonders of contradictions. The central African region like her peers in African contemporary politics has been one such hub where Human security needs as a result of governance miscarriages have become preoccupying. A grasp of why there is a critical need for reform of the Security Sector and how good governance represents its bedrock can emanate from the attempt to clearly situate the meaning of both and create the correlations therefrom.

Good governance here refers to the process by which all the Institutions of government including its actors are not only fully engaged to obtain individual and collective comfort but are also predisposed to respect the rights and responsibilities of everyone as mutually or consensually agreed. Good governance takes into consideration the welfare of everyone within the state as well as the resources and institutions that form an integral part of that society or state. It seeks not only to protect the state or society from external aggression but to seek avenues for the complete securitization of humanity by guaranteeing basic human freedoms. Such engagements are found to be of critical urgency to States of the Central African region haunted by strife exhibiting itself in forms of hunger, poverty Unemployment as well as armed rebellion, violence War, and crime. To this should be added other externally imposed nuances to development like transnational crime and militia incursion. These are security threats that can never be handled simply by the ownership or use of

sophisticated weaponry but by a combination of the hard and soft power matrix under an efficient, legitimate, Law abiding, and soundly governed system. The security required for states found within this hub as well as by countries caught within this matrix of political and socioeconomic development requires constant reform. Our concern in this article is to situate the concept of good governance and its key characteristics and its framework for security sector reform and connect the propensity of this to make or mar the development process. Our narrative here is informed not only by current debates on Security Sector reform but also by positions upheld by core organizations Like the UN, EU, and the AU. By so doing we will be dealing with concepts like preventive diplomacy/deterrence which includes Conflict prevention and peacebuilding. We hope in this endeavor to make contributions that are wholly valid not only for good governance correlation to security sector reform but also to policy reformation or reorientation in the central Africa Sub region with its wider replications in the Countries of the South as well as those of the North.

I. Need for Good Governance and the Security Sector Reform

The rapid changes produced by the end of the Cold War, the fall of The Berlin Wall, and the disintegration of the Communist block imposed new demands on the World's international scenery and its geo-strategic position. This was informed in Africa not only by the end of the apartheid regime in South Africa but also by the new wind of change that necessitated a renewed interest in the liberalization of the economies of most African States. Within the course of this liberalization developed a conscious realization that bad governance was at the background of so many Wars, civil strife, hunger, and disease that were undermining African Security operatives. The UN took judicial notice of this growing scourge and by 1992 produced an elaborate report which called on its member states to adhere to an elaboration of their governance system placing human Security at its crucial hub. In so doing, the UN urged its continental organs like the EU and the AU to take special measures to ensure the new program of internal and external peacebuilding which will impose a context-relevant Security reform. Though not clearly emphasized, this world organization was asking its member states to understand that the age of hard power diplomacy violently worshiped by the realist, rightist, and Hobbesian schools was obsolete to respond to the growing national and international

needs. This organization consciously observed that the concepts of both deterrence, preventive diplomacy or the building of ideological blocs were not enough to guarantee world peace and sustainable development but that such was possible within the framework of good governance which will initiate a Security Sector Reform to appeal to New Needs. Good governance by this thinking was designed and was to be brought on board to create an enabling environment where social class distinction and discrimination which is a vital tool of mass protest in Africa will disappear and citizens will develop trust for the institutions that govern them and seek to protect them. Building realms of trust between the governed and the governing, between the civil and military confinement of the state will require a shift in paradigm in both the Security apparatus and its operatives.

II. Good Governance and Its operatives

Good governance as per this paradigm shift above, will create an environment for free competition and choices, and create jobs for its youths. Good governance will not only provide space and structures for training and education but will take sound and lasting schemes through and within which, those trained and or educated will easily get themselves integrated into the world of jobs and work towards national construction than destruction. In Africa, the concept of good governance and its accompanied Security Sector Reform had become a fundamental issue so much that by 2013 numbers states were recommended to engage in a broad range of measures that will as per the Security Sector Reform. As per the blue print manual print document produced to this effect, countries were required to:

.... Develop broad principles relating to the security sector that were to be elaborated in a number of key instruments including but not limited to the Constitutive Act of the African Union, the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union, the Solemn Declaration on a Common African Defense and Security Policy, and the Policy on Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development (PCRD), among others. In addition, a set of global SSR norms and principles have been developed by the United Nations and are elaborated in the UN Secretary-General's report on SSR and subsequent UN documents. These principles form the overarching framework for the African Union's approach to SSR. Further to the above, the following core

principles of SSR encompass those values that are particularly relevant for or unique to the African continent⁴

This clearly situates where the Union has taken the step to engage its member states on the new paradigm shift and how this is indicative of both the highly prized principles of peacebuilding and sustainable development. Specifically referring to good governance and security sector reform this frame opined that the new dispensation will involve a broader democratization and reform process as well as enable it to:

adhere to basic good governance principles, including accountability and transparency, and be undertaken within the broader framework of the rule of law, non-discrimination, and respect for human rights. In this regard, SSR will be part of the continuous review of security institutions.⁵

This submission wholly attests to the fact that the elements underlying the security reform sector lie in the hands of the political process and since governance is often in the hands of politicians who are civil than military authorities, the hardcore values of the Security sector reform will depend upon the political will making governance and Security sector reform mutually interdependent.

A. Conceiving the Concise Meaning of Governance and its operatives

Governance in itself is a very broad concept used and interchanged by a lot of scholars. This paper has elected to use the definition offered by Boubacar N'Ddiaye and Nicole Ball plus Fayemi to stand out as the most relevant. In laying the framework for the underpinning of Security Sector Reform in Mali, Ddiaye defines government as being the actors and institutions that have the legitimacy of deciding how power over people, land, and resources can be ordered and used equitably for the good of all. A government has to develop a clear-line agenda and seeks to develop and make a work culture amongst its citizens where there is a feeling of security from current and impending threats. The government's legitimacy is derived from issues like consensus, transparency, and responsibility to name but just a few. Any government that does not build strong

⁴African Union Policy Framework on Security Sector Reform (SSR) adopted at the 20th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the Union, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 27 – 28 January 2013.p.14
Assembly/AU/Dec.472(XXX). Para 21. That Assembly: commended the Commission for having completed the development of the draft AU Policy Framework on Security Sector Reform (SSR), in fulfillment of Assembly Decision Assembly/AU/Dec.177(X) of January 2008, URGES Member States to take advantage of the Policy, and encouraged the Commission to avail the required assistance to Member States in this respect.

⁵ Ibid.

institutions with a clean separation of powers and does not build a Constitution stronger than all institutions and persons should be considered as bad. In this regard forms of government like Dictatorship and all forms of government reminiscent of regimes like fascism or Nazism of early twentieth-century Europe are bad governance.

Bad governance will naturally pervade the role of Law, dismiss or reduce to the barest minimum the environment or space for transparency in managing human and natural resources, and implant a system of central-periphery dichotomy where a select or self-appointed few individuals manages, and even, own all the factors of production plus the market values of demand and supply. This situation in all cases builds streams of doubts and mistrust for the political process in that the usurpation of the public space by such elites creates streams of discontent rife with poverty, crime and disease. Such hardly undertake any serious reform or transformation for almost little is done to ensure that sustainable development thrives. It was in this realm of thought that proponents of good governance rhetoric like Ronald Regan and Margaret Thatcher stressed the need for all states to engage in broad streams of measures that will ensure global good governance. Their submissions were however limited in reasoning for they used a purely economic lens to perceive bad governance to be only capable of sustaining the rise of self-seeking or rent-seeking individuals leading to enormous market failures. Though their submissions failed to provide a based account, they nevertheless provide the muse with which the UN EU and the AU developed further to be the aspects of good governance and its accompanied Security Sector Reform.

B. Good Governance as Role Model for Security Sector Reform

As a concept and practice, good governance has been used and interchanged with democratic governance. It thrives when some basic conditions are made or appreciably attended to. This is what some scholars have elected to call characteristics or key elements of good governance. These basic conditions according to UN specifications include; accountability and transparency at all levels of transactions within states by those in positions of authority, the development and effective practice of the art of consensus in decision-making by the elected and appointed leaders, the cultivation and practice of the art of

sensitivity to citizens bulging problems, especially on matters of public concern by those heading the institutions of public governance along with the equitable allocation of tangible and intangible resources plus their efficient management. To this broad spectrum of ideas must be added the cultivation and enforcement at all top, middle, and bottom levels of government transactions including the optimum respect for Human Rights, and the rule of Law. In this kind of system, all issues connected to governance are not in the hands of a privileged but cogently dissolves to be lodged within the reach of states and non-state actors and/ or Institutions not excluding the civil society that plays a key role. Such systems citizens seek to protect their governments and institutions because they are sure that they are part of it. Such systems incidentally create an awareness between citizens that the security of goods and persons within the national confines is a collegial rather than a responsibility abandoned to those involved in the primary Security provision. Good governance in this thinking is a form of conscious Security reform because it sweeps away tensions and contradictions that can easily built security challenges.

III. Paradigm Shift and the Growth of Security Sector Reform from Good Governance

As indicated, the need for good governance, especially in Africa is already an overworked topic in the field of science. If scant attention was given to it before 2008, the need became not only crucial but gravely urgent in Africa following the Arab spring and the conflagration of other problems of internal insecurity that these uprisings created. With the idea of an overflow of reactions from the non-employed non protected and disgruntled many looming Conscious states took the initiative to pump a series of government reforms including that of the Security Sector. The reform projects undertaken had multiple agendas but aggregately intended to drive home the notion that good governance combines elements of national security, economic development, and basic human rights keeping at its thrust the optimum willingness of protecting people from the fear of violence.

It this package of measures it was wholesomely accepted that the protection of the state and its citizens from external aggression remains a consideration but there are more pending threats facing countries on the African continent at the

beginning of the 21st century emerging from internal and transnational causes not directly associated with full-scale war as earlier thought and presented by the architects of the traditional School. This thinking engineered and shaped the regard African states had been holding dear about their security. Human security complements state security, enhances human rights, and strengthens human development. It seeks to protect people against a broad range of threats to individuals and communities and, further, empower them to act on their own behalf. It goes further to forge a global alliance to strengthen the institutional policies that link individuals and the as well as the state with a global world. Human security thus brings together the human elements of security of rights, of development and carefully links this to the general dialogue and debates about holistic security in Africa.⁶ Such a Security prism can only emerge from the rungs of good governance and should be ultimately engaged in the process of playing or perfuming certain key roles seen by recent scholarship as worthy signposts of holistic new paradigm security tenets.

IV. Peacebuilding as Governance Security Reform Device

Adopting a peacebuilding approach to sorting any conflict crises or influences of instability from some perceived and unforeseeable directions should be the prime objective of any State with its eyes on sustainable development. A modern security sector should not be bordered by its hardware but should seek to be given reforms in training and orientations that will make it keep up to the speed of the values of good governance. It should seek further to care about its security environment, including regional and international considerations, and to evaluate the roles and missions of the different security organizations. The outcome of such an assessment may be to engage in a significant restructuring of the security sector in order to maximize its capacity to protect the state and its citizens from the full range of threats identified and integrate the security sector fully into a system of democratic governance. Concretely:

A peacebuilding approach to human security simultaneously requires ensuring that the civil authorities have the capacity to manage and oversee the security organizations according to the principles of democratic governance and that the various non-state actors play their respective roles responsibly and, in a manner, consistent with democratic governance.⁷

⁶ Commission on Human Security, *Security Now*, New York, 2003, <http://www.humansecurity-chs.org/finalreport/FinalReport.pdf>, pp. 2, 4.

⁷ Nicole Ball and Kayode Fayemi, *Security Sector Governance in Africa ; A hand book*

This is a worthy take-home assignment given to states in the global hub they can only attain such heights if they grew to understand that security is both a public good and a national service warranting the participation of all. State should therefore take measures that will enable them to create a culture or reset all its sectors. These reforms must be informed by local realities. These realities must be relevant to the international law and enable such states to belong wholly to the entire alignment of the concert of nations for a state is not an independent isolate in International Relations.

V. Nexus of Good Governance and Security Sector Reform

If the modern definition of security brings together elements like the assembly of measures taken and readily available to protect the States, societies, or organizations and their accompanied resources together with the people and environmental confines from all sorts of harms, threats, and wants, then governance and security sector reform in Africa are like two parts of the same coin though the former is the universal set lodging the latter. One of the greatest benefits of good governance is that it reduces the amount of time and resources spent scrambling for answers. Good governance is not only able to achieve the most optimized use of resources, but it is also able to accommodate the needs of stakeholders.

The survival of each state depends to a very large measure on its nature of security and the survival of each state security system depends on the government and its regard to both internal and external problems. Well-governed states will ensure that:

- Laws are made through local national consensus but relevant to the International Law, that the state's natural resources are equitably used for the benefit of all,
- The fundamental rights and responsibilities of each citizen are freely respected
- The state is loved and admired not on account of any coercion but on account of its serviceability and provisions of the human basic new or of the opportunities where all could easily get these needs
- The state establishes a system of guidance and control which will hew out a culture of accountability, trust, and commitment in all public and private dealings

- Modernize its entire Security through sponsorship, follow-up, and training to carry out its security operatives within the ambit of the Law.

This gives us the responsibility to understand certain basic principles that are intricately hinged to Security and good governance. It will require us to first of all have a grasp of the meaning of Security Sector Reform and its accompanied variables since the concept of governance seems to have been belaboured at this point.

A. The Security Sector Globally Considered

The Security Sector specifically refers to all the institutions of the state responsible for securing the state and its population from fear of violence. In this study, the security sector is taken as consisting of the armed forces, the police and intelligence services, the related ministries and departments, paramilitary forces, and governmental oversight organizations including other paramilitary and intelligence services that cater for the various aspects of the state welfare like the Customs, Coast and forest guards. An understanding to be made of this implication is that the Security sector should not be understood in this present context to mean only the institutions and actors legally authorized to use force but to encompass institutions working together to provide support and linkages to those dealing with the military hardware. For the security of the states, goods, and persons to ascertain everyone in the state or non-state security confinement must play its role and this requires the good wisdom of good governance for the working of these principles. In practice, the internal security apparatus is headed by refined military men /women whose grades vary not only by country but also by the situation but most overall bosses of such Sectors are civilians who owe their appointments to civilian authorities. These bosses seek not only to ensure that security actors play their roles within the ambit of the law but also Security-sector oversight in that they scrutinize the operationalization governance and issues relating and security actors' maintenance of fluid relations with elected authorities, independent institutions along with civil society. This in large measure locates the indispensability of good governance should the Security Sector requires some form of reform or transformation.

B. Understanding Security Sector Reform

Just like a new and encompassing concept in international diplomacy, the concept of Security is shrouded in a multiplicity of definitions. However, the AU has suggested a definition that this article holds as all-embracing and therefore standard. In an attempt to suggest Security reform as worthy practices that stand solid for the eradication of conflict Crises and War throughout the African Continent the AU in its Policy reform framework for the Security Sector underscore the link between good governance and Security Sector reform by defining this to refer to:

the process by which countries formulate or re-orient the policies, structures, and capacities of institutions and groups engaged in the security sector, in order to make them more effective, efficient, and responsive to democratic control, and to the security and justice needs of the people. This policy takes note that “Security Sector Reform” is sometimes expressed as security sector governance, security sector transformation, security sector development, security sector review as well as security and justice reform.⁸

SSR, therefore, represents Piecemeal, stand-alone changes to the security sector, often limited to doctrinal changes, operational effectiveness, and cost-cutting drives, occurring as by-products of other state reform initiatives and often without “buy-in” from critical stakeholders and thus subject to reversal depending on the power structure of the state. It has to do with meaningful and systematic change not only of the structures but also of the doctrine where software power dynamics are allowed to operate wholesomely. Reform is gradual steady and subject to a peaceful transition from the old ways that praised only primary Security providers and left the other worthy segment to wander in the wild to a new lane where every aspect of the security counts. It is not only embracing and encompassing methods adopted to change the Security hardware but models to make every aspect of this sector count and respond to current new security challenges.

It is related but not synonymous with security transformation which is a holistic change of the security sector, aimed at altering the relations of power within the sector in the direction of civil/constitutional control to transform institutional culture, promote professionalism, improve resource utilization and

⁸ African Union Policy Framework on Security Sector Reform (SSR), Adopted at the 20th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the Union, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 27 – 28 January 2013. Assembly/AU/Dec.472(XXX). Para 21. required assistance to Member States in this respect. See pages 4-6.

operational effectiveness (on the side of the security forces, better policy management (on the side of civil authorities), in tandem with accountability and respect for human rights and international law and involving inputs from a wide range of stakeholders and role-players. Implementing a security-sector transformation process involves a series of reforms, but with SST, the reforms are embedded in a broad transformation process.

In further fertilizing the discussion of the fact that good governance provides the best nexus for Security reform in Africa the AU Policy paper unequivocally ascertains that SSR is an integral part of democratization, modernization, and good governance reform processes when it opines that:

SSR as part of a broader democratization and reform process: SSR is an essential but not a sufficient condition for lasting peace and security and therefore it may need to be part of a broader democratization and reform effort. SSR may need to be integrated as early as possible into peace processes and it may also form an essential element of conflict prevention, early recovery, peace-building and sustainable development, including poverty reduction. In post-conflict situations, SSR and DDR may be intrinsically linked and may complement each other. *SSR and good governance:* SSR will adhere to basic good governance principles, including accountability and transparency, and be undertaken within the broader framework of the rule of law, non-discrimination, and respect for human rights. In this regard, SSR will be part of the continuous review of security institutions.⁹

This nexus becomes more indispensable when the definition of security goes further to stretch as far wide as seeking to guarantee the provision of basic life needs or the opportunities to secure food shelter, health, and freedom along with making informed choices and the protection of the environment. With this, the actors of security become far and varied and involved not only the known state actors but a conflagration of people and conglomerate all hinged into work in the context of governance. There is therefore a broad range of non-state actors, including religious groups, academics, policy researchers, the media, women's groups, professional associations such as the bar association, community-based organizations, labour unions, and interested citizens forming the nucleus of the current security architecture.

⁹ Ibid.

In a well-governed system where laws are made through a consensus and where accountability and other forms of good governance are respected, the security burden is made lighter and the possibility of peace and sustainable growth is guaranteed to a very large extent. Civil society as non-state actors in this kind of framework fundamentally plays three key three critical roles. They perform these roles by increasing the accountability of the security sector: demand change, act as a watchdog, and provide technical input. The Reform of the Security Sector is not in any way new in International Politics. It has grown to take shape in most deals in Africa and more particularly in the Central African Sub Region owing to the fact that countries are more threatened by internal Human Security problems than by external aggression.

With the cost of managing wars engineered most by bad governance and over-concentration of the military might a consciousness was mounted and made concrete within the realms of high-level international diplomacy which placed a high premium on Peacebuilding and Conflict prevention. Proponents of Peace Building and/or Conflict prevention doctrine pushed through and successfully erected this as prime issues worth being applied by every State. The body politics of this doctrine opined that good governance by any state will, first of all, breathe in its values to the entire architecture of the Security Sector making it to be more performant in the field of opened battles, transparent in the use of the resources within their care, morally obedient to the etiquettes and deontology of their profession thereby respecting all the Laws and placing the protection of human security at a prime hub. Good governance it is hoped will use representative or popular democracy to provide structures and Institutions based on consensus and develop a resource allocation both to the Security and civil confinements that are mutually beneficial and obedient to the judicial process. To this should be added the fact that good governance will ensure transparency in the recruitment, promotion, and appointment of all the Civilo-Military departments.

Indeed, good governance will ensure that there is optimum respect for the rule of Law and the constitutions of sovereign states guarantee the respect of basic human rights and build streams of thoughts and trust where public affairs are copiously adhered to. It was further strongly sustained that a responsible

governing system will besides taking frantic steps to reduce inequality and desperation which have been the root causes of instability, mounting criminality, and armed protests in most states, also strive to set standards for Security hardware sophistication and professionalization through sponsorship, training and follow up. Such a system will help to create fluid lines where the army, police, gendarmes, and all the entire paraphernalia of the security operate and understand that all the departments of Security including the non-state elements are mutually dependent. With this those who are legally permitted to enforce the order or protect state sovereignty with a gun will automatically grow to understand their security or effective application of their security operatives depend to a large extent on the civilian figments and the trust of merit fired by the judiciary sector. The population on their part will definitely develop the culture of seeing security men and security operatives as protectors who are out to carter for their collective and individual well-being.

In this realm, Politicians and bureaucrats are expected by those who elected them to be accountable for the actions of the security organizations by defining a set of democratic governance criteria against which the security organizations are to be measured. Modern Security, therefore, encompasses a compendium of things most of them having to do with civil and even non-state elements and actors. This Security jackets influencers fall squarely within the reach of state governance thereby making governance and Security not only connected but greatly inseparable. This does not suggest however that there is nothing like the Security Sector.

The Security Sector begging for reform which is a subject of debate here refers to the institutions responsible for securing the state and its population from fear of violence. It goes further to encompass even the private militia and other forms of intelligence within the civil arena that collects and furnishes information to State Security. The security sector of the States of the Central African Sub -Region shares some differences in structure, infantries, and nomenclatures from one state to the other but are mostly composed of the armed forces, the police and intelligence services, the related ministries and departments, paramilitary forces, and governmental oversight organizations that ensure accountability and transformations.

C. Challenges and Strides of Good governance and SSR in the Central African Sub Region

The situation of good governance and Security Sector Reform in the Central African Sub Region is both hilarious and worrisome enough to stand the taste of profound study. Without a model specification of how democracy can be appropriated here to suit local needs, the search for a round or near-perfect model of governance that can provide an adequate response to the multiplicity of problems plaguing the states of this region is still in the broad wild. Cameroon which was for a long time considered an oasis of peace in the turbulent ocean has been for the past one and a half decades or snidely more, haunted by a myriad of problems from internal governance and transnational uprisings that stand to heighten the need for good governance and Sector Reform here. As a central African Regional Hegemon going by population Size, land, water forest, and food resources governance and Security Reform in Cameroon provides a worthy story to understand strides of Security Sector Reform within this niche.

VI. The Cameroon Situation of Good Governance and SSR

The situation of Cameroon's governance provides a muse for the understanding of the array of problems faced by states of the Central African Sub Region. As indicated, this country was hailed as an island or isolation of peace in the turbulent ocean. Ahidjos regime had some elements of constitutional and brute force elements of democracy to provide space for some form of development. In context, the security sector confirmed in detail with the thinking of the time that atoned lavished praise on hardware sophistication or modernization. There were pressing internal and external imperatives which pushed Ahidjo not only to modernize but also to expand his Security architecture. On one hand, there were the French accords on security imperatives signed in 1963 which placed a high premium on an extensive Security system built in the likeness of that of France with its accompanied intelligence and espionage system. The need too for modernization and some kind of reform was reinforced with the passage of time, by the growing nuances created by the renegade UPCist and those who either dreaded or hated Adhidjo's high-handed style of governing Cameroon on the other hand.

A. Reasons and Strides on the Security Sector Reform in Cameroon

The need to use required force if the need arose to ramp down the beauty and urgency of the full worship of nation Building and National integration combined with the French Mentorship to usher in reforms in the Cameroon Security Sector during the early years of Ahidjo reigns. Working on the sides of these driving reasons could also be added the fact that, the Cameroon economy was already being considered a regional hegemon in the overwhelmingly French Central African Sub Region. This was a privilege that neither Ahidjo nor the French was prepared to lose and these prospects could only be made solid through an erection of an efficient defence and Security Sector. The procurement of an elaborate military hardware by the Cameroon government moved in this direction. It was almost a custom of the time for any nation to build its security force by getting mass weapons of War for their demonstration on national feast days indicated to the masses and the wider world that such nations were not minions in international power politics.

B. Internal Strife and Consolidation of Unity through SSR Reforms

Added to the need of crushing dissenting voices from both East and West Cameroon Ahidjo wasted no time in erecting a superb Security and defence Sector that ranked almost top in the Sub Region. He used this Security apparatus to good effect and ensured that unity even if it was to remain a semblance of it ranked top above any other ethic of political consideration. The regime initiated a broad range of measures where an enormous sort of firmness was required to put the sub-elements together. The creation of the Police and the Gendarmes units of Internal Security to deal with civil matters as well as the Army rescue teams and other paramilitary Units to handle matters away from engaging in armed conflict or protecting territorial limits indicates that the idea of Human Security predates the time when either the UN, EU or AU decided to take them seriously.

C. Local International Diplomacy and its furthering of SSR

The security problems or challenges at the time ranged from UPC insurgents, the overflow of criminals emerging from the Nigerian Civil War of 1967-70s as well as internal squabbles developed by the Crime wave, trans-border piracy, and others. Though it cannot be effectively said that Ahidjos government could

in real terms of the word be classified as good, it is amazing to note that he established a security apparatus that had excellent coordination with each department poised to achieve worthy results. Cameroon's stability in the central African region could also be accounted for by the booming economy that market structures and strategic planning erected. By 1982 when Ahidjo resigned unemployment was at its all-time low school graduates could easily find jobs while the private sector which was overwhelmingly in the hands of the missions or lay private institutions fared well. Human Security needs were less prevalent but there was a strong commitment on the part of the governing cartel under the skewed leadership of Ahidjo and his foreign partners to initiate reforms. There were so many positive changes not only within the primary Security Sector and defence providers but also within the economy to respond to the growing needs and all of this worked in favour of handling basic human security needs.

Conclusion

Good Governance as a framework for security sector reform in the central African region is neither new nor already overworked. There are two interdependent governing variables that most African States have been grappling with for a very long time. Countries of the central African region cannot be wholly confirmed to have taken up the full gospel as raised to the heights of religious dogma by countries of the West but are at the hub of real transition. The same measure of truth holds Security Sector Reform and the awareness of Human Security needs as civil security providers and other non-combat security elements were already engagements immediately after Independence. This paper has among other things established the nexus (framework) between good governance and Security Sector Reform. It has attempted to bring out the changing matrixes which these two interdependent governing concepts have undergone in scholarship indicating the strides and failures both have encumbered. On a more specific account, an attempt has been made to have a survey of the situation of the operationalization of these concepts in the different states in the studied region showing the strides made, the problems encountered and the way forward. Its submissions align with those of sound scholars in the discipline Saibou Issa, Joseph Nye, Ntunda Ebode, and Sevidzem to name but a select few that the Central African Region

is in a fragile security paradigm caused by a conflagration of home-born and foreign problems. It steps further to opine that away from the model specification provided African Security Reform will flower and blossom the day States engage in the business of building strong indigenous institutions relevant to African relationism and cosmopolitanism than strong men.

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